The Dark Triad traits—narcissism, Machiavellianism and psychopathy—have been found to be associated with intra- or interpersonal deception production frequency. This cross-sectional study ( N = 207) investigated if the Dark Triad traits are also associated with deception detection accuracy, as implicated by the recent conception of a deception-general ability. To investigate associations between maladaptive personality space and deception, the PID-5 maladaptive personality traits were included to investigate if besides Machiavellianism, Detachment is negatively associated with response bias. Finally, associations between the (...) Dark Triad traits, Antagonism, Negative Affectivity and confidence judgments were investigated. Participants watched videos of lying vs. truth-telling senders and judged the truthfulness of the statements. None of the Dark Triad traits was found to be associated with the ability to detect deception. Detachment was negatively associated with response bias. Psychopathy was associated with global confidence judgments. The results provide additional support that dark and maladaptive personality traits are associated with judgmental biases but not with accuracy in deception detection. The internal consistencies of 4 of the 8 subscales of the used personality short scales were only low and nearly sufficient (αs =0.65–0.69). (shrink)

The present cross-sectional study (N = 205) tested the hypothesis that the Dark Triad traits – narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy – and the PID-5 maladaptive personality traits – Negative Affectivity, Detachment, Antagonism, Disinhibition and Psychoticism – are associated with specific deception-related perceptions: perceived cue-based deception detectability, perceived deception production, and deception detection ability. Participants completed personality and deception measures in an online setting. All three Dark Triad traits and Antagonism were associated with perceived deception production ability, but not (substantially) with (...) perceived deception detection ability and cue-based deception detectability. The results provide a more fine-grained picture of biases associated with the Dark Triad traits in the context of deception and further support the relevance of Antagonism and Detachment as deception relevant personality traits. (shrink)

In two pre-registered online studies during the COVID-19 pandemic and the early 2020 lockdown (one of which with a UK representative sample) we elicit risk-tolerance for 1,254 UK residents using four of the most widely applied risk-taking tasks in behavioral economics and psychology. Specifically, participants completed the incentive-compatible Balloon Analog Risk Task (BART) and the Binswanger-Eckel-Grossman (BEG) multiple lotteries task, as well as the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Task (DOSPERT) and the self-reported questions for risk-taking used in the German Socio-economic Panel (SOEP) (...) study. In addition, participants in the UK representative sample answered a range of questions about COVID-19-related risky behaviors selected from the UCL COVID-19 Social Survey and the ICL-YouGov survey on COVID-19 behaviors. Consistently with pre-COVID-19 times, we find that risk tolerance during the UK lockdown (i) was higher in men than in women and (ii) decreased with age. Undocumented in pre-COVID-19 times, we find some evidence for healthier participants displaying significantly higher risk-tolerance for self-reported risk measures. We find no systematic nor robust patterns of association between the COVID-19 risky behaviors and the four risk-taking tasks in our study. Moreover, we find no evidence in support of the so-called “risk compensation” hypothesis. If anything, it appears that participants who took greater risk in real-life COVID-19-relevant risky behaviors (e.g., isolating or taking precautions) also exhibited higher risk-tolerance in our experimental and self-reported risk-taking measures. (shrink)

In this contribution we investigate the conceptual coherence of penal substitution and its moral validity. After assessing two opposing modern contributions, we turn to Reformed and medieval scholasticism. This scholastic manoeuvre sheds additional light on the analytic questions at issue. Following Owen and Scotus in their use of a relational analysis of guilt and its punishment, we argue that penal substitution is conceptually and morally coherent, albeit not univocally vis-à-vis ordinary punishment. Absent from the case of substitution is personal deservedness; (...) herein we follow Murphy. However, this leaves open the conceptual possibility of representative deservedness. (shrink)

Social prescriptions are one term commonly used to describe non-pharmaceutical approaches to healthcare and are gaining popularity in the community, with evidence highlighting psychological benefits of reduced anxiety, depression and improved mood and physiological benefits of reduced risk of cardiovascular disease and reduced hypertension. The relationship between human health benefits and planetary health benefits is also noted. There are, however, numerous barriers, such as duration and frequencies to participate in activities, access, suitability, volition and a range of unpredictable variables impeding (...) a comprehensive approach to their use on a wider scale. From a multidisciplinary perspective, this commentary incorporates a salutogenic and nature-based approach to health, we also provide a range of recommendations that can be undertaken at the patient level to assist in shifting the acknowledged systemic barriers currently occurring. These include using simple language to explain the purpose of health empowerment scripts, ensuing personal commitment to a minimum timeframe, enabling ease of access, co-designing a script program, providing ongoing motivational support and incorporating mindfulness to counter unexpected disruptions. (shrink)

BackgroundBiobanking biospecimens and consent are common practice in paediatric research. We need to explore children and young people’s (CYP) knowledge and perspectives around the use of and consent to biobanking. This will ensure meaningful informed consent can be obtained and improve current consent procedures.MethodsWe designed a survey, in co-production with CYP, collecting demographic data, views on biobanking, and consent using three scenarios: 1) prospective consent, 2) deferred consent, and 3) reconsent and assent at age of capacity. The survey was disseminated (...) via the Young Person’s Advisory Group North England (YPAGne) and participating CYP’s secondary schools. Data were analysed using a qualitative thematic approach by three independent reviewers (including CYP) to identify common themes. Data triangulation occurred independently by a fourth reviewer.ResultsOne hundred two CYP completed the survey. Most were between 16–18 years (63.7%, N = 65) and female (66.7%, N = 68). 72.3% had no prior knowledge of biobanking (N = 73).Acceptability of prospective consent for biobanking was high (91.2%, N = 93) with common themes: ‘altruism’, ‘potential benefits outweigh individual risk’, 'frugality', and ‘(in)convenience’.Deferred consent was also deemed acceptable in the large majority (84.3%, N = 86), with common themes: ‘altruism’, ‘body integrity’ and ‘sample frugality’. 76.5% preferred to reconsent when cognitively mature enough to give assent (N = 78), even if parental consent was previously in place. 79.2% wanted to be informed if their biobanked biospecimen is reused (N = 80).ConclusionProspective and deferred consent acceptability for biobanking is high among CYP in the UK. Altruism, frugality, body integrity, and privacy are the most important themes. Clear communication and justification are paramount to obtain consent. Any CYP with capacity should be part of the consenting procedure, if possible. (shrink)

Edition of parts six and seven with glossary.

As artificial intelligence (AI) thrives and propagates through modern life, a key question to ask is how to include humans in future AI? Despite human involvement at every stage of the production process from conception and design through to implementation, modern AI is still often criticized for its “black box” characteristics. Sometimes, we do not know what really goes on inside or how and why certain conclusions are met. Future AI will face many dilemmas and ethical issues unforeseen by their (...) creators beyond those commonly discussed (e.g., trolley problems and variants of it) and to which solutions cannot be hard-coded and are often still up for debate. Given the sensitivity of such social and ethical dilemmas and the implications of these for human society at large, when and if our AI make the “wrong” choice we need to understand how they got there in order to make corrections and prevent recurrences. This is particularly true in situations where human livelihoods are at stake (e.g., health, well-being, finance, law) or when major individual or household decisions are taken. Doing so requires opening up the “black box” of AI; especially as they act, interact, and adapt in a human world and how they interact with other AI in this world. In this article, we argue for the application of cognitive architectures for ethical AI. In particular, for their potential contributions to AI transparency, explainability, and accountability. We need to understand how our AI get to the solutions they do, and we should seek to do this on a deeper level in terms of the machine-equivalents of motivations, attitudes, values, and so on. The path to future AI is long and winding but it could arrive faster than we think. In order to harness the positive potential outcomes of AI for humans and society (and avoid the negatives), we need to understand AI more fully in the first place and we expect this will simultaneously contribute towards greater understanding of their human counterparts also. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 34.4 (2001) 275-291 [Access article in PDF] The Conceptual Unity of Aristotle's Rhetoric 1 - [PDF] Alan G. Gross and Marcelo Dascal The standard view--that the Rhetoric lacks conceptual unity--has strong and prestigious support, stretching over most of the century. To David Ross in 1923 the unity of the Rhetoric was practical, not theoretical; to misunderstand this fact was to see this work, mistakenly, as "a (...) curious jumble of literary criticism with second-rate logic, ethics, and politics, and jurisprudence, mixed with the cunning of one who knows well how the weaknesses of the human heart are to be played upon" (285). So unaltered has been this view over the years that, in 1995, Jonathan Barnes could turn Ross's metaphor into an argument concerning the Rhetoric's lack of intellectual focus: it presents, not one art, but fragments of three arts, and of three arts that exist quite independently of rhetoric. The sections on logic have the closest connections with dialectic and in part overlap with what Aristotle says in the Topics; the sections on the emotions are linked to the ethical and psychological writings; Book III... shares its subject matter with the Poetics. Rhetoric... is a magpie, thieving a piece of one art and a piece of another, and then botching a nest of its own. (Companion 263-64) To Ross and Barnes, while logos, êthos, and pathos are essential to rhetorical invention, and style and arrangement are essential to rhetorical performance, they have nothing conceptually in common. Insofar as disciplinary identity depends on such conceptual unity, rhetorical studies lack such identity.William Grimaldi offers an alternate view; beneath Ross's jumble, he sees as the work's fundamental unifying principle, the enthymeme, which serves both as a form of argument and as a source for arguments about fact, character, and emotion. On this view, the factual content of a rhetorical argument is structured logically, a structure that is then molded linguistically [End Page 275] by means of êthos and pathos to suit the requirements of the particular case: "The content of... statements, the manner in which propositions will be expressed, the language, and images in casting the statements will be determined by the topical examination of the ethos and pathos of [a] particular speaker-auditor's situation" (Commentary I, 335n). Grimaldi convinced no one that this was the case; as Jakob Wisse has pointed out, Grimaldi's interpretation takes unacceptable hermeneutic liberties (27-28); nothing in the Rhetoric supports his view of the enthymeme as the central organizing principle of the work.Although we agree that Grimaldi was mistaken, we would like to argue that he was correct in seeing inferential processes as the key to the Rhetoric's conceptual unity. We would like to claim, however, that, contrary to Grimaldi's view, each of the three pisteis is inference-based, as is the canon of style. Moreover, the canon of arrangement, while not inference-based for Aristotle, plays a vital role in strengthening the patterns of inference that speakers prefer; in addition, it can be inference-based, as Perleman and Olbrechts-Tyteca have shown. So much conceptual unity seems to us consistent with Aristotle's definition of rhetoric; if such unity exists, it would mean that Aristotle was correct in calling rhetoric a tekhnê, which was, like dialectic or medicine, a unified body of knowledge (1.1.2-1354a1-14)We are not going to argue that the text as we have it is conceptually unified; obviously, no text that contains inconsistent views and serious ambiguities can be unified and there is little doubt that the Rhetoric contains such inconsistencies and ambiguities. With the aid of current scholarship, however, we intend to construct from the text a consistent theory of persuasion with inference as its base. In our construction, we will add nothing to Aristotle. But we will omit some passages--especially, a crucial one in which he seems clearly to spurn emotional and ethical means of persuasion (1.1.3-1354a16-45). We will also prefer some interpretations--especially an... (shrink)

Within the current global atmosphere where a universally accepted police force is nonexistent, there are several voluntary norms and codes of conduct that exist to guide how corporations behave worldwide. These have come as a result of many years of poor performance in the areas of social, financial, and environmental responsibility. Such norms are expected to prescribe and proscribe certain types of corporate behavior but when one examines the reality on the ground, the story is not that straightforward. This article (...) assesses the effectiveness of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in the Ghanaian context with a focus on the mining sector. Based on primary qualitative data the argument is that even though the EITI is performing some function, it has ways to go before it can become an across‐the‐board viable tool for transparency and proper accountability. Five prevailing weaknesses are discussed to underscore this case. (shrink)

Inhalt: P. Meusburger: Einleitung - Entstehung und Zielsetzung dieses Buches H. H. Blotevogel: Sozialgeographischer Paradigmenwechsel? Eine Kritik des Projekts der handlungszentrierten Sozialgeographie von Benno Werlen J. Ossenbrugge: Total entankert, normal verstrickt. Anmerkungen zur Situation der Geographie und ihrer Reformulierung durch Benno Werlen W.-D. Sahr: Der Ort der Regionalisierung im geographischen Diskurs P. Weichhart: Die Raume zwischen den Welten und die Welt der Raume P. Meusburger: Subjekt - Organisation - Region. Fragen an die subjektzentrierte Handlungstheorie G. Hard: Raumfragen W. (...) Zierhofer: Die fatale Verwechslung. Zum Selbstverstandnis der Geographie H. Kluter: Raum und Organisation R. Danielzyk: Ein Konzept fur empirische Regionalforschung M. Schafranek: Regionale Begrifflichkeit und die Dialektik von global und lokal B. Werlen: Handlungszentrierte Sozialgeographie. Ein Blick auf die Kritiken. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

This book traces the intellectual revolution initiated by Thales in the sixth century BC to its culmination in the metaphysics of Parmenides.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Logik-Vorlesung: Unveröffentlichte Nachschriften I (Logik Bauch), and Logik-Vorlesung: Unveröffentlichte Nachschriften II (Logik Hechsel, Warschauer Logik)Hoke RobinsonTillmann Pinder, editor. Logik-Vorlesung: Unveröffentlichte Nachschriften I (Logik Bauch), and Logik-Vorlesung: Unveröffentlichte Nachschriften II (Logik Hechsel, Warschauer Logik), vols. 8 and 9 of the series Kant-Forschungen, general editors Reinhard Brandt and Werner Stark. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998. Vol. 8, pp. lxx + 268; vol. 9, pp. vii + 718. NP.Between 1755, when (...) he received the venia legendi, and 1796, when he ended his teaching activity, Kant taught logic some 30 times. In accordance with the requirements of the Prussian ministry of culture, his course lectures were built around a recognized text, G. F. Meier's 1752 Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre. Kant did not merely present Meier's views, however, but commented on and criticized these as he thought appropriate; his own copy of Meier was full of marginal notes and interleaved with notes on separate bits of paper. When in 1799 he entrusted G. B. Jäsche with this material for the compiling of a logic text, the thought was presumably of a Kantian logic organized around Meier's framework.Since logic plays such a prominent role in the Critical philosophy, one would expect the Jäsche logic to be viewed as an important tool for the interpretation of the Critical philosophy. But dissatisfaction with it was evident right from its original publication in 1800, and later scholars were even more negative (in 1913 Erich Adickes referred to it [End Page 603] as "the contrivance [Machwerk]... that Jäsche published under the name of Kant's logic," Erich Adickes, quoted in Ak. XXIV.960). And in fact, as Pinder's careful and detailed introduction points out, the nature and origin of the Jäsche logic presented a serious problem for Wilhelm Dilthey's organization of the now-standard Akademie-Ausgabe (Kants gesammelte Schriften, herausgegeben von der königlich preussischen [now: deutschen] Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902- Cited as "Ak.").Dilthey conceived of four divisions of the Akademie-Ausgabe: Kant's published writings, his correspondence, his literary remains ("handschriftlicher Nachlass") and his lectures ("Vorlesungen"). Where, exactly, did the Jäsche logic belong? Kant had himself compiled a similar text from his lecture notes on anthropology, and this text was published in the first division (in volume VII). But did the Jäsche logic count as Kant's work? It was indeed authorized by Kant and based on Kant's own lecture notes; but these notes themselves were to be published in the Nachlass division. Furthermore, as it turned out, Jäsche had also employed manuscripts compiled from the lectures themselves, and these were to be published in the Vorlesungen division. This would not include his own transcription, as Erdmann had conjectured. It turns out Jäsche never heard Kant lecture on logic—he was never in Königsberg when they were being held! (xxvi, n. 29). The resulting controversies delayed the publication of the Jäsche logic in vol. IX from 1908 until 1923, after the 1914 publication in the Nachlass division of the notes on which it was based.Dilthey's projected Vorlesungen division itself was called into question by Benno Erdmann, Dilthey's successor as Akademie-Ausgabe general editor. Erdmann recognized the questionable nature of the Jäsche logic and the other compilations, but considered Dilthey's aim for a "critically secured" edition of the lecture manuscripts as "hopeless." Still, interest in the manuscripts resulted in their piecemeal publication independently of the Akademie-Ausgabe, and when the Nachlass division's publication had been completed in 1955, the Vorlesungen division was resurrected. Vol. XXIV (in two parts) appeared in 1966; it contained the logics Blomberg, Philippi, Pölitz, Busolt, Dohna-Wundlacken and the Vienna logic, the short logic Herder, and fragments of the lost logics Hintz and Hoffmann. The Pinder volumes reviewed here contain the logics Bauch, Hechsel, and the Warsaw logic.What exactly are the manuscripts in question? If Kant had been concerned merely to explicate Meier, his students could perhaps have been content with their marginal notes in the text and a few further ones for elucidation. But... (shrink)

Explorations in Systems Phenomenology in Relation to Ontology, Hermeneutics and the Meta-dialectics of Design -/- SYNOPSIS A Phenomenological Analysis of Emergent Design is performed based on the foundations of General Schemas Theory. The concept of Sign Engineering is explored in terms of Hermeneutics, Dialectics, and Ontology in order to define Emergent Systems and Metasystems Engineering based on the concept of Meta-dialectics. -/- ABSTRACT Phenomenology, Ontology, Hermeneutics, and Dialectics will dominate our inquiry into the nature of the Emergent Design of the (...) System and its inverse dual, the Meta-system. This is an speculative dissertation that attempts to produce a philosophical, mathematical, and theoretical view of the nature of Systems Engineering Design. Emergent System Design, i.e., the design of yet unheard of and/or hitherto non-existent Systems and Metasystems is the focus. This study is a frontal assault on the hard problem of explaining how Engineering produces new things, rather than a repetition or reordering of concepts that already exist. In this work the philosophies of E. Husserl, A. Gurwitsch, M. Heidegger, J. Derrida, G. Deleuze, A. Badiou, G. Hegel, I. Kant and other Continental Philosophers are brought to bear on different aspects of how new technological systems come into existence through the midwifery of Systems Engineering. Sign Engineering is singled out as the most important aspect of Systems Engineering. We will build on the work of Pieter Wisse and extend his theory of Sign Engineering to define Meta-dialectics in the form of Quadralectics and then Pentalectics. Along the way the various ontological levels of Being are explored in conjunction with the discovery that the Quadralectic is related to the possibility of design primarily at the Third Meta-level of Being, called Hyper Being. Design Process is dependent upon the emergent possibilities that appear in Hyper Being. Hyper Being, termed by Heidegger as Being (Being crossed-out) and termed by Derrida as Differance, also appears as the widest space within the Design Field at the third meta-level of Being and therefore provides the most leverage that is needed to produce emergent effects. Hyper Being is where possibilities appear within our worldview. Possibility is necessary for emergent events to occur. Hyper Being possibilities are extended by Wild Being propensities to allow the embodiment of new things. We discuss how this philosophical background relates to meta-methods such as the Gurevich Abstract State Machine and the Wisse Metapattern methods, as well as real-time architectural design methods as described in the Integral Software Engineering Methodology. One aim of this research is to find the foundation for extending the ISEM methodology to become a general purpose Systems Design Methodology. Our purpose is also to bring these philosophical considerations into the practical realm by examining P. Bourdieu’s ideas on the relationship between theoretical and practical reason and M. de Certeau’s ideas on practice. The relationship between design and implementation is seen in terms of the Set/Mass conceptual opposition. General Schemas Theory is used as a way of critiquing the dependence of Set based mathematics as a basis for Design. The dissertation delineates a new foundation for Systems Engineering as Emergent Engineering based on General Schemas Theory, and provides an advanced theory of Design based on the understanding of the meta-levels of Being, particularly focusing upon the relationship between Hyper Being and Wild Being in the context of Pure and Process Being. (shrink)

English summary: It seems that reason is less a universal principle than something inherently bound to the contexts in which it appears. These contributions to a conference held on the occasion of Christoph Schwobel's 60th birthday explore the character of reason's manifold contexts: the grounding of reason in the inner word of God 's Trinitarian life as well as the disclosure of reason and and its limits in human conversation. German description: Vernunft scheint in der Gegenwart weniger ein allgemeines Prinzip (...) als eine in Kontexte eingebundene Grosse zu sein. Die Beitrage einer Tagung anlasslich von Christoph Schwobels 60. Geburtstag, gehen der Frage nach dem Charakter dieser Kontextbindung nach: der Begrundung der Vernunft im trinitarischen Gesprach wie der Erschliessung und Problematisierung der Vernunft im menschlichen Gesprach. Mit Beitragen von V. Brummer, G. van den Brink, C. Drobe, H. J. Eckstein, D.-M. Grube, J. Halfwassen, S. Heine, F. Hermanni, E. Herms, W. Harle, W. Homolka, W. Jeanrond, R. W. Jenson, D. Kelsey, A. F. Koch, A. Kupsch, V. Leppin, P.-C. Lai, P. Lo, A. Min, J. Moltmann, M. Muhling, P. Peterson, M. Sarot, F. Schweitzer, A. Torrance, J. Webster, M. Welker, M. Wendte, M. Wisse, H. Wisskirchen und L. Zak. (shrink)

In this paper I shall venture into an area with which I am not very familiar and in which I feel far from confident; namely into phenomenology. My main motive is not to get away from standard, boring, methodological questions like those of induction and demarcation; but the conviction that a phenomenological account of the empirical basis forms a necessary complement to Popper's falsificationism. According to the latter, a scientific theory is a synthetic and universal, hence unverifiable proposition. In fact, (...) in order to be technologically useful, a scientific hypothesis must refer to future states-of-affairs; it ought therefore to remain unverified. But in order to be empirical, a theory must bear some kind of relation to factual statements. According to Popper, such a relation can only be one of potential conflict. Thus a theory T will be termed scientific if and only if T is logically incompatible with a so-called basic statement b, where b is both empirically verifiable and empirically falsifiable. In other words: T is scientific if it entails ¬b; where b, hence also ¬b, is an empirically decidable proposition. (shrink)

Let ZF denote Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (without the axiom of choice), and let $M$ be a countable transitive model of ZF. The method of forcing extends $M$ to another model $M\lbrack G\rbrack$ of ZF (a "generic extension"). If the axiom of choice holds in $M$ it also holds in $M\lbrack G\rbrack$, that is, the axiom of choice is preserved by generic extensions. We show that this is not true for many weak forms of the axiom of choice, and we derive (...) an application to Boolean toposes. (shrink)

Changes in healthcare financing increasingly rely upon patient cost-sharing to control escalating healthcare expenditures. These changes raise new challenges for physicians that are different from those that arose either under managed care or traditional indemnity insurance. Historically, there have been two distinct bases for arguing that physicians should not consider costs in their clinical decisions—an “aspirational ethic” that exhorts physicians to treat all patients the same regardless of their ability to pay, and an “agency ethic” that calls on physicians to (...) be trustworthy advisors to their patients. In the setting of greater patient cost-sharing, physicians' aspiration and agency roles increasingly conflict. Satisfactorily navigating the new terrain of consumer-driven healthcare requires physicians to consider these two roles and how they can best be reconciled so as to maximize quality of care while respecting the heterogeneity of patients' financial resources and willingness to pay. (shrink)

Zermelo once wrote that he had anticipated Russell's contradiction of the set of all sets that are not members of themselves. Is this sufficient for having anticipated Russell's Paradox — the paradox that revealed the untenability of the logical notion of a set as an extension? This paper argues that it is not sufficient and offers criteria that are necessary and sufficient for having discovered Russell's Paradox. It is shown that there is ample evidence that Russell satisfied the criteria and (...) that Zermelo did not. (shrink)

Reprint. Originally published: 1959; 1st Princeton/Bollingen pbk. ed. published: 1970.